RE: seminar report on atm with an eye
||ATM WITH AN EYE
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There is an urgent need for improving security in banking region. With the advent of ATM though banking became a lot easier it even became a lot vulnerable. The chances of misuse of this much hyped ‘insecure’ baby product (ATM) are manifold due to the exponential growth of ‘intelligent’ criminals day by day. ATM systems today use no more than an access card and PIN for identity verification. This situation is unfortunate since tremendous progress has been made in biometric identification techniques, including finger printing, facial recognition, and iris scanning.
This paper proposes the development of a system that integrates Facial regognition and Iris scanning technology into the identity verification process used in ATMs. The development of such a system would serve to protect consumers and financial institutions alike from fraud and other breaches of security.
The rise of technology in India has brought into force many types of equipment that aim at more customer satisfaction. ATM is one such machine which made money transactions easy for customers to bank. The other side of this improvement is the enhancement of the culprit’s probability to get his ‘unauthentic’ share. Traditionally, security is handled by requiring the combination of a physical access card and a PIN or other password in order to access a customer’s account. This model invites fraudulent attempts through stolen cards, badly-chosen or automatically assigned PINs, cards with little or no encryption schemes, employees with access to non-encrypted customer account information and other points of failure.
Our paper proposes an automatic teller machine security model that would combine a physical access card, a PIN, and electronic facial recognition. By forcing the ATM to match a live image of a customer’s face with an image stored in a bank database that is associated with the account number, the damage to be caused by stolen cards and PINs is effectively neutralized. Only when the PIN matches the account and the live image and stored image match would a user be considered fully verified. A system can examine just the eyes, or the eyes nose and mouth, or ears, nose, mouth and eyebrows, and so on.
Our ATM system would only attempt to match two (and later, a few) discrete images, searching through a large database of possible matching candidates would be unnecessary. The process would effectively become an exercise in pattern matching, which would not require a great deal of time. With appropriate lighting and robust learning software, slight variations could be accounted for in most cases. Further, a positive visual match would cause the live image to be stored in the database so that future transactions would have a broader base from which to compare if the original account image fails to provide a match – thereby decreasing false negatives.
When a match is made with the PIN but not the images, the bank could limit transactions in a manner agreed upon by the customer when the account was opened, and could store the image of the user for later examination by bank officials. In regards to bank employees gaining access to customer PINs for use in fraudulent transactions, this system would likewise reduce that threat to exposure to the low limit imposed by the bank and agreed to by the customer on visually unverifiable transactions.
In the case of credit card use at ATMs, such a verification system would not currently be feasible without creating an overhaul for the entire credit card issuing industry, but it is possible that positive results (read: significant fraud reduction) achieved by this system might motivate such an overhaul.
The first ATMs were off-line machines, meaning money was not automatically withdrawn from an account. The bank accounts were not (at that time) connected by a computer network to the ATM. Therefore, banks were at first very exclusive about who they gave ATM privileges to. Giving them only to credit card holders (credit cards were used before ATM cards) with good banking records. In modern ATMs, customers authenticate themselves by using a plastic card with a magnetic stripe, which encodes the customer's account number, and by entering a numeric passcode called a PIN (personal identification number), which in some cases may be changed using the machine. Typically, if the number is entered incorrectly several times in a row, most ATMs will retain the card as a security precaution to prevent an unauthorised user from working out the PIN by pure guesswork..
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE
ATMs contain secure cryptoprocessors, generally within an IBM PC compatible host computer in a secure enclosure. The security of the machine relies mostly on the integrity of the secure cryptoprocessor: the host software often runs on a commodity operating system.In-store ATMs typically connect directly to their ATM Transaction Processor via a modem over a dedicated telephone line, although the move towards Internet connections is under way.
In addition, ATMs are moving away from custom circuit boards (most of which are based on Intel 8086 architecture) and into full-fledged PCs with commodity operating systems such as Windows 2000 and Linux. An example of this is Banrisul, the largest bank in the South of Brazil, which has replaced the MS-DOS operating systems in its automatic teller machines with Linux. Other platforms include RMX 86, OS/2 and Windows 98 bundled with Java. The newest ATMs use Windows XP or Windows XP embedded.
ATMs are generally reliable, but if they do go wrong customers will be left without cash until the following morning or whenever they can get to the bank during opening hours. Of course, not all errors are to the detriment of customers; there have been cases of machines giving out money without debiting the account, or giving out higher value notes as a result of incorrect denomination of banknote being loaded in the money cassettes. Errors that can occur may be mechanical (such as card transport mechanisms; keypads; hard disk failures); software (such as operating system; device driver; application); communications; or purely down to operator error.
Early ATM security focused on making the ATMs invulnerable to physical attack; they were effectively safes with dispenser mechanisms. ATMs are placed not only near banks, but also in locations such as malls, grocery stores, and restaurants. The other side of this improvement is the enhancement of the culprit’s probability to get his ‘unauthentic’ share.
ATMs are a quick and convenient way to get cash. They are also public and visible, so it pays to be careful when you're making transactions. Follow these general tips for your personal safety.
The main issues faced in developing such a model are keeping the time elapsed in the verification process to a negligible amount, allowing for an appropriate level of variation in a customer’s face when compared to the database image, and that credit cards which can be used at ATMs to withdraw funds are generally issued by institutions that do not have in-person contact with the customer, and hence no opportunity to acquire a photo.
Because the system would only attempt to match two (and later, a few) discrete images, searching through a large database of possible matching candidates would be unnecessary. The process would effectively become an exercise in pattern matching, which would not require a great deal of time. With appropriate lighting and robust learning software, slight variations could be accounted for in most cases. Further, a positive visual match would cause the live image to be stored in the database so that future transactions would have a broader base from which to compare if the original account image fails to provide a match – thereby decreasing false negatives.
For most of the past ten years, the majority of ATMs used worldwide ran under IBM’s now-defunct OS/2. However, IBM hasn’t issued a major update to the operating system in over six years. Movement in the banking world is now going in two directions: Windows and Linux. NCR, a leading world-wide ATM manufacturer, recently announced an agreement to use Windows XP Embedded in its next generation of personalized ATMs (crmdaily.com.) Windows XP Embedded allows OEMs to pick and choose from the thousands of components that make up Windows XP Professional, including integrated multimedia, networking and database management functionality. This makes the use of off-the-shelf facial recognition code more desirable because it could easily be compiled for the Windows XP environment and the networking and database tools will already be in place.
Inspite of all these security features, a new technology has been developed. Bank United of Texas became the first in the United States to offer iris recognition technology at automatic teller machines, providing the customers a cardless, password-free way to get their money out of an ATM. There's no card to show, there's no fingers to ink, no customer inconvenience or discomfort. It's just a photograph of a Bank United customer's eyes. Just step up to the camera while your eye is scanned. The iris -- the colored part of the eye the camera will be checking -- is unique to every person, more so than fingerprints. And, for the customers who can't remember their personal identification number or password and scratch it on the back of their cards or somewhere that a potential thief can find, no more fear of having an account cleaned out if the card is lost or stolen.
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS.
When a customer puts in a bankcard, a stereo camera locates the face, finds the eye and takes a digital image of the iris at a distance of up to three feet. The resulting computerized "iris code" is compared with one the customer will initially provide the bank. The ATM won't work if the two codes don't match. The entire process takes less than two seconds.
The system works equally well with customers wearing glasses or contact lenses and at night. No special lighting is needed. The camera also does not use any kind of beam. Instead, a special lens has been developed that will not only blow up the image of the iris, but provide more detail when it does. Iris scans are much more accurate than other high-tech ID systems available that scan voices, faces and fingerprints.
We thus develop an ATM model that is more reliable in providing security by using facial recognition software. By keeping the time elapsed in the verification process to a negligible amount we even try to maintain the efficiency of this ATM system to a greater degree. One could argue that having the image compromised by a third party would have far less dire consequences than the account information itself. Furthermore, since nearly all ATMs videotape customers engaging in transactions, it is no broad leap to realize that banks already build an archive of their customer images, even if they are not necessarily grouped with account information.